Truth

Truth is the idea against which most other ideas are measured, since nearly every claim made about them is offered as true. Under this heading the Harvard Classics take up a cluster of questions that are connected but distinct. They ask what truth and falsehood are. They ask how truth is known and told apart from error, dream and report. They ask why men seek truth, or flee it. And they ask whether a man is bound to speak it, swear by it, and suffer for it. Logicians, mystics, scientists, poets, dramatists and tellers of fables all take part, and the subject therefore cuts across the whole collection. It touches metaphysics in Augustine, method in Descartes, politics in Milton and Mill, morals in Kant and Locke, and comedy in Sheridan and Cervantes.

The first question is where truth resides. Hobbes gives the narrowest answer. Truth and falsehood are attributes of speech, not of things, and consist in the right ordering of names in affirmations¹. Rousseau’s vicar makes truth depend on the existence of things rather than on the judging understanding². Schiller holds that truth is produced by the thinking power in its own liberty, not received from outside³. Older voices place truth in being itself. For Augustine all things are true in so far as they are, and falsehood is thinking that to be which is not⁴. Pascal adds that falsehood presupposes truth⁵, and Emerson that falsehood is nothing and begets no fact⁶. From there it is a short step to identifying truth with the divine. Marcus Aurelius calls universal nature truth and the prime cause of all true things⁷. Augustine finds truth more certain than his own life and names it God⁸, so that a happy life is “joy in the truth”⁹. Thomas à Kempis echoes him¹⁰, and Dante’s mind rests only in the ultimate Truth, as a beast rests in its lair¹¹. Emerson carries the theme into a modern idiom. The soul perceives truth as surely as we know we have woken from a dream¹², and truth is the summit of being and makes itself believed¹³.

If truth is one, why do men disagree? Descartes holds that truth on any point is single, so that whoever grasps it knows all there is to know there¹⁴. Pascal agrees that truth is one and constant¹⁵. Yet he also says that among human things everything is partly true and partly false¹⁶. Error, on his account, comes from following one truth while omitting another¹⁷, and custom makes truth on one side of the Pyrenees error on the other¹⁸. Johnson watches truth and error displace each other from age to age¹⁹. Lowell says truth lies in a well where each sees his own image²⁰, and Mill finds the warring centuries each holding half the truth, like a shield white on one side and black on the other²¹. Schiller strikes a hopeful note: the individual errs, but the species is led to truth²².

How then is truth to be known? Descartes is the central modern figure. He doubts not as the sceptics do but to reach rock beneath the sand²³. His first precept is to accept nothing that is not clearly and distinctly known²⁴. From I think, hence I am he derives the rule that what is clearly and distinctly conceived is true^25,26, a rule he finally rests on the veracity of God²⁷. Pascal is less confident. Contradiction is no sign of falsity, nor its absence a sign of truth²⁸. Reason and the senses deceive each other²⁹, and apart from faith we have no certainty of first principles³⁰. Still, he holds, we have an idea of truth that scepticism cannot overcome³¹. The ancients felt the same pull. Augustine feared, with the Academicians, that certainty could not be had, yet resolved to search on³². Socrates warns against concluding that arguments contain no truth when the fault lies in our own lack of skill³³. Rousseau’s vicar, finding only contradiction³⁴, admits as evident only what his sincere heart cannot refuse³⁵. Mill settles for an assurance sufficient for human life³⁶.

Telling reality from dream is an old form of the same problem. Homer and Virgil distinguish true dreams, which pass through gates of horn, from lying ones, which pass through gates of ivory^37,38. Calderón’s Segismund cannot tell palace from masquerade³⁹ and resolves to act well whether he wakes or dreams⁴⁰. Descartes holds waking thoughts more reliable than dreams⁴¹, and Berkeley grounds reality in the fixed order of ideas⁴². Cervantes turns the problem into comedy in the dispute over basin and helmet, where each party claims to know the truth⁴³. Against such tests others appeal to inner light. Augustine recognizes truths as already within him⁴⁴. Emerson holds that moral truth is an intuition that cannot be received at second hand⁴⁵, and Thoreau that wild dreams may be no less true for offending common sense⁴⁶. Berkeley, by contrast, claims common sense as his ally against scepticism⁴⁷.

Most of what men believe they take on report, and so the weighing of testimony becomes a large part of the subject. Hobbes rests belief on trust in another’s knowledge and honesty⁴⁸. Hume grounds that trust in experience of men’s inclination to truth⁴⁹, but he demands witnesses of undoubted integrity⁵⁰. He concludes that even excellent testimony may support a palpable falsehood⁵¹, and that knavery is more probable than a breach of natural law⁵². Pascal uses the same criteria for the opposite purpose. Moses does not hide his people’s shame⁵³, and Jewish enemies make irreproachable witnesses⁵⁴. Raleigh defends the report of headless men by the number of people who independently affirm it⁵⁵, while Montaigne finds certainty hard to come by even about a battle⁵⁶. Historians and editors vow fidelity. Drake writes to correct untruths about his voyages⁵⁷, and Caxton corrects his edition against a truer copy⁵⁸. Cervantes’s narrator insists that no history is bad if it is true⁵⁹. Carlyle asks the biographer to set down essential truth without shrinking from unpleasant facts⁶⁰. Cruder tests also appear. Theseus longs for a double voice that would expose liars⁶¹, and the Wali of the Nights says truth comes out only by beating⁶². Yet Plutarch’s Andocides confesses falsely to save his life⁶³. Hobbes grants torture only the weight of conjecture⁶⁴, and in Shelley’s Cenci torture makes truth and falsehood indistinguishable⁶⁵. Rumour, finally, mingles truth with lies⁶⁶. Small lies grow into prodigies⁶⁷, and Sheridan’s gossips embroider a duel until the supposedly wounded man walks in unharmed^68,69.

Why seek truth at all? Bacon calls the inquiry, knowledge and belief of truth the sovereign good of human nature⁷⁰. Confucius would die content having learned the truth at daybreak⁷¹, and Marcus Aurelius seeks the truth by which no man was ever injured⁷². Hume finds love of truth the one passion that scepticism leaves intact⁷³. The moderns set truth above authority. Harvey’s true philosophers love truth above antiquity⁷⁴, and Pascal argues that truth is older than every opinion about it⁷⁵. Pascal adds a warning, however: truth apart from charity is an idol⁷⁶. The search calls for certain dispositions. Montaigne would have the pupil yield his weapons to truth the moment he sees it⁷⁷. Epictetus says the seeker need not fear defeat⁷⁸. Descartes contrasts the easy appearance of truth with truth itself, which unfolds slowly⁷⁹. Voltaire praises Newton for abandoning a theory when the measurements disagreed⁸⁰, and Locke and Penn warn that disputers forget truth in their zeal for victory^81,82. Sometimes the search costs more than patience. Socrates speaks truth knowing no honest fighter survives in politics⁸³. Milton’s Abdiel holds to truth alone against thousands⁸⁴. Calvin recalls that truth came from despised Micaiah, not from four hundred prophets⁸⁵, and Pascal, alone against thirty thousand, calls truth his whole strength⁸⁶. Yet Pascal also says our task is to fight for truth, not to make it triumph⁸⁷.

Poetry poses its own question. Sidney argues that the poet, who affirms nothing, is least a liar⁸⁸. Keats identifies beauty with truth⁸⁹. Arnold, following Aristotle, finds the best poetry marked by higher truth and seriousness⁹⁰, and Wordsworth and Shelley claim for poetry a general and eternal truth^91,92. Poe dissents: truth and poetry are oil and water⁹³. Cervantes’s canon condemns the romances of chivalry as lies⁹⁴, while granting that a fiction pleases more the nearer it resembles truth⁹⁵. Johnson denies that any stage representation is ever mistaken for reality⁹⁶.

The political form of the question is whether truth needs protection. Cicero holds that truth prevails even in the assembly when it is openly laid out⁹⁷. Milton’s Areopagitica is the classic statement. Truth needs no licensing; she is never worsted “in a free and open encounter” with falsehood, and confuting error is her best suppression⁹⁸. Truth, in Milton’s myth of Osiris, was hewn in pieces and must be gathered limb by limb⁹⁹. Unexercised, it becomes a muddy pool of conformity¹⁰⁰. Mill develops each of these points. Suppression robs men of the livelier impression truth gains from its collision with error¹⁰¹. Popular opinions are seldom the whole truth, and heresies often preserve its suppressed fragments^102,103. Received truths that go undiscussed become dead dogma¹⁰⁴. But Mill denies the comfortable belief that truth always triumphs over persecution. Its only advantage is that it may be rediscovered¹⁰⁵. Milton himself concedes that truth often appears implausible at first and invites prohibition¹⁰⁶. Lowell’s truth on the scaffold sways only the future¹⁰⁷.

Why do men resist truth? Augustine’s answer is that men love truth when it enlightens them and hate it when it reproves them¹⁰⁸. Pascal makes this aversion inseparable from self-love: we desire flattery, and the higher we rise the further we are from truth^109,110. Bacon observes that a mixture of lies adds pleasure¹¹¹. Shakespeare’s Fool notes that truth is whipped to its kennel while flattery stays by the fire¹¹², and Machiavelli warns princes that flattery can be avoided only by taking no offence at truth¹¹³. Schiller locates truth’s weakness in the closed heart rather than in the understanding¹¹⁴. Emerson, characteristically, insists that men secretly wish to be convicted of their nonsense¹¹⁵. Pascal condemns indifference in the search as both sinful and foolish¹¹⁶.

Truthfulness as a virtue unites ancient and modern writers. Confucius says a man cannot live without truthfulness, as a cart cannot run without its crosspole¹¹⁷. Marcus Aurelius bids us speak the truth freely and without disguise¹¹⁸. Plato holds that false words infect the soul¹¹⁹, and in Acts Ananias lies to God and dies¹²⁰. Bacon calls a lie brave toward God and cowardly toward men¹²¹. Penn notes that habitual lying destroys a man’s credit¹²², as Aesop’s shepherd boy learns¹²³. Kant gives the duty its strictest form. A lying promise cannot be willed as universal law¹²⁴, and it uses another merely as a means¹²⁵. Locke would never deceive children¹²⁶ and forgives twenty faults sooner than one strained truth¹²⁷. The hard cases lie between plain truth and plain lie. Luther denounces papal “mental reservation”¹²⁸, and Penn calls equivocation halfway to lying¹²⁹. Stevenson argues that true veracity conveys a true impression, so that a lie may be told by a truth or by silence^130,131. Against all this Machiavelli counsels princes to dissemble, since deceivers always find dupes¹³². Bacon allows concealment only when it is needed and judges a habit of simulation a vice^133,134. Polonius catches truth with a bait of falsehood¹³⁵, and Webster’s Duchess stages a “noble lie” to protect honour¹³⁶. Macaulay notes the Italian statesman’s indifference to truth in affairs alongside his devotion to it in speculation¹³⁷.

The same tension marks oaths and promises. Luther holds that faith must be kept even with enemies¹³⁸, whereas an Italianate in Harrison keeps faith only while it costs nothing¹³⁹. Hippolytus’ true oath is scorned as a trick¹⁴⁰ while Sinon’s false one wins Troy¹⁴¹. Voltaire reports that the Quakers’ plain yea or nay satisfies their judges¹⁴², and Faust thinks a plighted word should suffice¹⁴³. Story after story turns on deception and its unmasking. Odysseus tells false tales in the likeness of truth¹⁴⁴, and Elmire contrives a scene in which Orgon must see Tartuffe for himself¹⁴⁵. A child exposes the emperor’s new clothes¹⁴⁶. Milton, however, judges hypocrisy invisible to all but God¹⁴⁷.

Religion raises truth’s highest claims and its sharpest contests. Thomas à Kempis says God is Truth and cannot deceive, while every man is a liar¹⁴⁸. The Koran rebukes those who clothe truth with falsehood¹⁴⁹. Calvin denies that miracles outweigh God’s truth¹⁵⁰. Pascal, by contrast, holds that doctrine needs miracles and miracles need doctrine, and that each truth is misused against the other¹⁵¹. Rousseau demands that a true religion bear signs common to all mankind¹⁵², and that doctrine be judged apart from miracles¹⁵³. Lessing finds that doctrine no longer depends on the miracles that first recommended it¹⁵⁴. Franklin likens every sect to a traveller in fog who sees others wrapped in it but not himself¹⁵⁵. Mill distinguishes the truth of a belief from its usefulness¹⁵⁶.

The books leave several questions open. Is truth a property of speech or of being? Does clear conception guarantee it, or only faith? May one lie to save life or honour? Does truth prevail of itself, or only when men are free to defend it? On these the authors divide. They agree, nearly all of them, that truth is worth more than the comfort of error.