Chapter 77
Opinion and belief as distinct from knowledge; public opinion; toleration of opinions.
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Opinion covers the large region of assent that falls short of knowledge. It includes the suppositions and beliefs men hold without demonstration, and also the shared sentiment of a crowd or nation that settles reputations, sways taste and props up governments. It is a great idea for these books because almost every author in them must decide how far to trust it. The philosopher has to test his own beliefs, and the scientist has to push against what everyone already accepts. The moralist asks whether to care what others think, the statesman governs by opinion, and the reformer pleads for its freedom. Socrates facing his jurors and Mill defending the solitary dissenter stand at the two ends of one long argument.
The oldest thread sets opinion against knowledge. Hippocrates says opinion leaves its possessor ignorant1. The Koran says those who dispute the death of Jesus follow only opinion and have no knowledge2, and Dante says mortals err in opinion where sense cannot unlock the truth3. Descartes notices that there are many conflicting opinions and only one can be true4. He adds that every absurdity has had its philosopher, so a plurality of votes guarantees nothing5, and he traces the diversity of opinion to different paths of thought, not to unequal reason6. Pascal agrees that nothing is too absurd for some philosopher to say7. Cervantes turns the point into comedy: Don Fernando polls the gentlemen on whether an object is a pannel, and the consensus overrides plain evidence8. Sir Thomas More treats the same logic gravely when he refuses to let the numbers of bishops and universities decide his conscience9. Yet not every field yields to demonstration. Hume separates judgments of fact, which have one true answer, from sentiment, which is always right10. Darwin admits that whether a form is a species or a variety can be settled only by the opinion of naturalists, and that competent judges disagree11,12,13.
The moderns ask what belief is. Hobbes calls the presumption that a thing will be or has been opinion, and a chain of alternating opinions doubt, which ends in judgment14. Hume asks what distinguishes belief from fiction, since we cannot believe at will in a man-horse15. He answers that belief is a felt sentiment, a more vivid and steady conception16, produced when custom joins an idea to a present impression17,18. Its strength follows the proportion of chances and the frequency of past experience19,20, so the wise man proportions belief to evidence21. Earlier writers practised this proportioning without a theory of it. Herodotus reports the phoenix but cannot believe it22, and he leaves readers to choose the more credible account23. Pascal, by contrast, mocks a Jesuit doctrine of probability that turns certitude into the mere safety of the road to heaven24.
Much belief rests on others. Hobbes analyses belief in testimony as two opinions, one about the speaker’s veracity and one about the truth of what he says; belief taken on authority is therefore faith in men only25,26. Milton calls belief held merely because the pastor says so empty even when it is true27. Pascal wants belief grounded in one’s own reason rather than in hearsay, antiquity or general consent28, and Penn treats inherited religion as authority, not conviction29. Bacon likens men who hand their judgments to others to the silent senators who only walked to a side30. Two moderns qualify the ideal. Burke works inherited opinions into his own meditation31, and Mill grants that most people must accept political and social opinions on the authority of those who have studied them, as they do in physical matters32.
Scepticism tempts those who see opinion’s frailty. Augustine, losing faith in the Manichees, is drawn to the Academics’ view that nothing can be grasped33. He remains a catechumen until something certain appears34, finds suspended assent harmful35, and resolves to search more diligently36. Pascal observes that nothing strengthens scepticism more than those who are not sceptics37, yet he also says scepticism rests on a dimness that neither doubt nor natural light can clear38. Hume recommends a mitigated scepticism that weans the mind from prejudices of education39 and teaches modesty to dogmatists who affirm violently40. Descartes undertakes to reform only his own opinions, warning most men against stripping away all their past beliefs41. While he doubts, he follows the most moderate opinions42 and keeps the truths of Faith in reserve43. Rousseau’s vicar admits that his own well-founded opinions may still be false44. Carlyle insists that doubt must precede affirmation45, but he laments that a sceptical age obstructs action46.
Marcus Aurelius goes further: “all is opinion”47,48. On his view things never touch the soul, and every perturbation comes from opinion within49. If the opinion of being harmed is removed, the harm is removed50; others’ acts disturb us only through our judgment that they are grievous51. Since we can hold whatever opinion we ought52, we write our own judgments and can wipe them out53. Praise and blame therefore do no real good or harm54, and like Socrates he calls the opinions of the many bugbears for children55. Hamlet echoes him: nothing is good or bad but thinking makes it so56. Even Marcus confesses that every man loves himself most yet values others’ opinion of him above his own57. He also demands readiness to change one’s mind, provided the change comes from persuasion of justice and not from pleasure or reputation58.
What forms opinion in the first place? Hobbes says men love their own opinions and dignify them with the name of conscience59. Bacon finds private judgment drenched in affections and customs60. More notes that men esteem their own inventions as the ape esteems its young61, and Mill traces moral opinions to wishes, prejudices and self-interest62. Custom works from childhood. Socrates must dislodge slanders planted in his jurors’ youth63. Locke observes that the beliefs men would die for are received from fashion64, and Rousseau that every nation confines truth to its own system65. Superstition fixes opinion past reason, as with Dana’s cook and his wizard Finns66 or Don Quixote’s enchantments set against Sancho’s plain sense67. Hobbes notes that crafty persons abuse such fear68. Against obstinacy Thomas à Kempis counsels yielding69, and Penn distinguishes steadiness from wilful stiffness70. Smith’s Columbus clings to the Indies despite the clearest evidence71. Mill adds the sobering point that false opinions may change while the habits of mind that produced them remain72.
Whose opinion counts, the many’s or the few’s? In the Crito Socrates answers that we should heed the one who understands, as a trainee heeds his trainer, and not the many73,74,75. Bacon holds that popular consent proves nothing76. Dante’s fools follow the popular voice until truth vanquishes it77, and Machiavelli finds the multitude so fickle that force must keep it in belief78. Pascal complicates the picture by arguing in alternation. The people’s opinions are sound, as in honouring birth or resenting blows79; then they are shown foolish, then sound again80. In the end they are sound but wrongly grounded81. Berkeley claims that common sense favours trusting the senses82, and he professes to unite what the vulgar and the philosophers each rightly hold83. The maxim vox populi, vox Dei fares poorly. Manzoni puts it in a sycophantic curate’s mouth84, and Darwin recalls that common sense once condemned the earth’s motion85.
For the conduct of life, Aesop’s man who tries to please everyone loses his donkey86, and Thomas à Kempis agrees that pleasing all is impossible87. Augustine describes the soul not yet stayed by truth as blown about by opinionated tongues88, and Rousseau finds that civilized man draws even his sense of his own existence from others’ judgment89. Emerson’s answer is self-reliance: trust one’s inmost thought90, and live by one’s own judgment amid the crowd91. Montaigne offers a gentler alternative. He presents his views as mere humours with no authority to command belief92, and Franklin, in the same spirit, avoids positive words like “certainly” and concedes readily when wrong93,94.
Public opinion as a collective force receives its fullest portrait in Manzoni. His crowds believe absurdities and are the real power95, and excited minds submit to the affirmations of the many96. During the plague, physicians who warn are hated as enemies of their country97, and Settala’s authority cannot prevail98. Fear then hardens suspicion into certainty99, until anyone who denies the poisoners’ plot is suspected as an accomplice100 and even Federigo dares not voice his doubts101. Ruskin says a mob thinks by infection102. Andersen’s crowd praises the invisible clothes for fear of seeming stupid103. Wordsworth distinguishes the enduring judgment of the People from the clamour of the Public104.
The press shapes this force. Burke describes literary cabals seizing the avenues to opinion105. Emerson says The Times commands English opinion and joins movements only when their victory is sure106,107. Mill observes that periodicals must echo opinion rather than improve it108. Pascal names the underlying relation: opinion is queen of the world, but might is its tyrant109,110.
Free governments, Lowell says, are governments by public opinion, whose quality decides their prosperity111. A popular magistrate must therefore wait for sentiment to advance toward him112. Washington asks that such opinion be enlightened113, and Burke finds the security of governments resting partly on opinion114. Mill sees the danger that this same dependence creates. Collective opinion, without any civil penalty, fetters individuality115. It is a collective mediocrity formed by newspapers116, and it threatens to make Europe another China117. Lowell, more hopeful, suggests that overbearing opinion may become the forcing-house of robust individuality118.
In science, received opinion has often resisted discovery. Copernicus feared the scorn of centuries of approval119. Harvey’s departure from the anatomists provoked envy, so he published that all might judge120. Lyell shows antiquaries inventing ever more visionary conjectures rather than abandon preconceived notions, until a new generation reviews the evidence121,122. Darwin likewise rests his hope on young naturalists123. Holmes blames prejudice or indolence for resistance to plain evidence124. Yet Jenner defends the laudable scepticism of medical men toward a novel doctrine125, and Pasteur welcomes methodical doubt while scorning ignorant contradiction126. Popular errors are corrected the same way, as when Smith exposes the notion that wealth is money127.
Toleration completes the argument. Milton holds that licensing can no more stop heresy than shutting a park gate can catch crows128. New opinions, he says, must be examined before they are condemned129, though he excepts popery and open impiety from toleration130. Browne will not be divided from anyone by difference of opinion131 and finds that persecution confirms heresies132. Utopia holds that belief cannot be compelled, though it bars unbelievers from office133, and Luther urges patience rather than force134. Burke objects that true toleration springs from respect for dogma, not from indifference135.
Mill systematizes the case. Silencing an opinion assumes infallibility136. Ages are no more infallible than individuals137, and protecting beliefs for their usefulness merely shifts the assumption138. Unchallenged truths decay into dead phrases139,140, and received doctrines usually hold only part of the truth141,142. Locke had already called difference of opinions a great advantage of society143. Mill adds that social stigma can be as effective as law144, keeping heresies smouldering and undiffused145.
Several questions remain open. One is whether opinion is a sickness to be cured, as Marcus Aurelius thought, or a partial truth to be cultivated, as Mill did. Another is whether the many’s verdict deserves Socrates’ disdain or Pascal’s qualified respect. A third is how a free people can be governed by opinion without being tyrannized by it, which neither Lowell nor Mill fully settles.
Introductory essay written by Claude Opus 5.5 from the outline and the notes on every passage below; quotations are checked against this edition.
See also: Custom and Convention 1b
See also: Nature 3b
See also: Rhetoric 7c
See also: Emotion 12a · Madness 8a · Truth 3d · Medicine 8b
See also: Slavery 8d · Prudence 8b
See also: Liberty 6b · Tyranny 6c
See also: Race and Nationality 3c
See also: Progress 3a · Cause 8a · Medicine 8c
See also: Wealth 12b
See also: Knowledge 8b · Liberty 5a · Censorship 1b · Truth 5a
See also: Liberty 5b · Censorship 1b · Truth 5b · Knowledge 4c
See also: Religion 12f
See also: Liberty 5c
See also: Truth, Knowledge, Judgment, Philosophy, Reasoning, Censorship