Chapter 56
Liberty and freedom: political, civil, religious and personal freedom; tyranny's opposite.
1058 passages · 421 principal · Covers the 49 volumes of primary texts
Liberty in these books covers the freedom of a city from a tyrant and of a slave from his master, the conscience’s freedom from compulsion in religion, the writer’s freedom from the licenser, and the individual’s freedom from the pressure of his neighbours. It also reaches inward, to the freedom of the will and the freedom of the soul from its own passions. It is a great idea for the Harvard Classics because almost no part of the collection leaves it untouched. The chorus of Aeschylus waits for freedom won once the tyrants fall1. Lincoln asks that a nation “conceived in liberty” have “a new birth of freedom”2. Between them Mill frames the whole of history as a struggle between liberty and authority3. One word gathers all these senses, and much of the argument consists in deciding which of them is primary.
The most economical definitions are the modern empiricists’. Hobbes calls liberty “the absence of external impediments,” and the right of nature the liberty to use one’s power to preserve one’s life4. Hume reduces liberty to the power to act or not act according to the will. So understood, he says, everyone agrees and the ancient dispute with necessity is merely verbal5,6. Liberty opposed to necessity rather than to constraint would be mere chance, which does not exist7. Yet Hume insists that liberty in his sense is essential to morality, since acts done from external violence cannot be praised or blamed8. Others find this account too thin. Rousseau’s Savoyard Vicar declares man a free agent: there is no will without liberty, and “necessity” is the empty word9. Liberty gives human acts the merit of virtue, and restraining it would reduce man to a brute10. In the *Discourse on Inequality*, consciousness of freedom is what distinguishes man from beast11. Milton had already rested merit and reward on free choice, since God set “a provoking object” before a free man12.
Kant carries the question beyond both the empiricists and the sentimentalists. Negative freedom, independence of alien causes, leads to positive freedom: causality by laws of the will’s own giving, which is autonomy13,14. On autonomy rests the dignity of rational beings15. Freedom cannot be proved from experience. It is an Idea of reason, necessarily presupposed by any being that acts under it16,17. Kant admits an apparent circle between freedom and moral law18. He also dissolves the conflict with natural necessity by regarding man from two standpoints, as free and as part of nature19. Schiller, starting from Kant, places freedom neither in sense nor in reason alone. It arises from the mutual constraint of the two impulses20, which the play instinct unites, setting man free physically and morally21. The aesthetic disposition “gives birth to liberty” and cannot itself be derived from moral liberty22. His diagnosis of the age is sober. Culture tightens physical fetters23, and freedom should not be conceded to men whose will is anarchic, because liberty must first be earned in character24.
An older and more persistent tradition locates freedom wholly within. For Epictetus, Diogenes was free not by birth but because he had cast away every handle by which slavery could grasp him25. Whoever sets store by body, office or repute is subject to another26. “Freedom is the name of virtue, slavery of vice”27. Marcus Aurelius likewise holds that no man can hinder him from choosing28. Montaigne turns the doctrine against death itself: “He who hath learned to die, hath unlearned to serve”29. The poets give it lyric form. Lovelace writes that stone walls do not a prison make30, and Byron hails Liberty as the “eternal spirit of the chainless mind,” brightest in dungeons31. The Christian writers accept the inwardness but alter its ground. Milton’s Michael teaches that true liberty dwells with right reason, and that when passion usurps reason man is enthralled outwardly as well32. Augustine names the sinner’s defiance “an unreal liberty” by which he forges his own chains33. For Thomas à Kempis, perfect liberty comes only by denying oneself and giving up possession of oneself34,35.
Luther gives this inward liberty its most famous paradox. The Christian is “free lord of all” and “dutiful servant of all”36. Faith removes the need of law and works for salvation, though it does not license a bad life37,38. The doctrine had immediate polemical edges. Ecclesiastical rules on vows, fasts and clerical celibacy are condemned as bonds where God has not bound39,40,41. Yet Luther, following Paul’s counsel that all things are lawful but not all expedient42, would use liberty quietly before the weak and openly against tyrants43. The fear that liberty will sink into licence recurs throughout. Calvin complains that many perverted the liberty of the spirit into licentiousness of the flesh44, and Milton’s sonnet says those who “bawl for freedom” mean licence45. Milton also stages the question cosmically. Satan argues that the angels are free and equal and owe no monarch, while Abdiel answers that to serve God is not servitude46,47. Even Mammon’s preference of “hard liberty” to the “easy yoke” of Heaven is made to sound almost noble48.
From liberty of conscience within the Church the argument passes to toleration within the state. More’s Utopus decreed that each man might follow and peacefully advocate his own religion49. Vane defines religious freedom as the magistrate’s refraining from coercion in things God has exempted50. Voltaire admires Penn’s universal toleration51 and the Englishman who “may go to heaven his own way”52. Defoe’s satire mimics the opposite case, treating liberty of conscience as dangerous indulgence53. The principle is written into law, first in the Massachusetts Body of Liberties54 and then in the American Constitution’s guarantee of religion, speech and press55. Mill observes that religious liberty was historically the one field in which individual right against society was defended on principle56.
On freedom of speech Milton and Mill are the twin authorities, and the shift between them is instructive. Milton argues largely from history and Christian dignity. Licensing comes from the Council of Trent and the Inquisition57. God trusts man with reason “to be his own chooser”58. Galileo’s imprisonment shows what licensing does to learning59. He prizes “the liberty to know, to utter, and to argue freely” above all liberties60. Mill argues from fallibility and utility. Even a government at one with the people has no right to silence dissent61, and complete liberty to contradict an opinion is the very condition that justifies acting on it as true62. Mill also sees a danger Milton scarcely names. Social intolerance, without fine or prison, stifles thought in England63. Hume and Voltaire agree that philosophy and science require entire liberty64,65. But the line between liberty and abuse remains disputed. Franklin refused to print libel despite pleas of press freedom66, while Sydney Smith exposes “licentiousness” as the anti-reformer’s word for any bold exposure of abuse67.
Mill’s larger principle is that society may interfere with the individual only for self-protection, and that over his own body and mind the individual is sovereign68. The only freedom worth the name is pursuing our own good in our own way69. Mill limits the principle to mature people capable of improvement by discussion70. He grounds it in individuality, for genius flourishes only in an atmosphere of freedom71, and he calls the contest between liberty and custom the chief interest of history72. The hard cases test him. He condemns prohibition as usurpation73 and voids any contract to sell oneself into slavery, since liberty cannot include its own alienation74. On those who profit from gambling, however, he leaves the boundary undecided75. Around him stand the ideals of independence. Emerson would leave each man to the rewards and penalties of his own constitution76. Thoreau contrasts the “absolute freedom” of wildness with merely civil freedom77. Burns honours one who will neither be nor have a slave78. Cervantes’ Marcela, “born free,” refuses subjection to any suitor79. Locke reminds us that the child’s liberty must grow with his years80.
Civil liberty, by contrast, is generally conceived as something partly surrendered in order to be secured. Hobbes counsels being content with as much liberty against others as one allows them against oneself81. Rousseau says men offered their necks to the yoke to secure the rest of their liberty, and so destroyed natural liberty irretrievably82,83. He nevertheless holds liberty an inalienable gift of nature84. Burke accepts the surrender: the restraints of society are themselves among men’s rights85. He claims English liberties as an inheritance, not as abstract rights of man86. Voltaire, less reverent, notes how near to slavery Magna Charta’s “freemen” stood87. For Burke liberty is no benefit unless combined with government, order and morality88, and he refuses to congratulate escaped madmen on their freedom89. The Federalist and Washington agree that vigorous government secures liberty90,91. Dryden goes further and calls republican freedom mock liberty92. The concrete guarantees are habeas corpus93 and consent to laws and taxes94. Smith adds the striking claim that every tax is a badge of liberty95. Mill warns that a free press and popular legislature would not make a country free if government controlled all enterprise96.
Smith’s system of natural liberty extends the idea to labour and trade. Under perfect liberty the advantages of occupations would equalize97. Property in one’s own labour is “most sacred”98, and the settlement laws violate natural liberty99. Yet Smith allows that liberty endangering society’s security may be restrained, as party walls prevent fire100. Mill later separates the question: restraints on trade are evils, but liberty is truly at stake only where the buyer’s access is curtailed101.
National freedom against tyranny is the oldest theme of all. Aristides holds all earth’s treasure worth less than the liberty of Greece102. Plutarch warns that the first destroyer of a people’s liberties is he who first gave them largesses103. Cicero mourns that liberty is lost and he must say nothing offensive104. Pliny calls turning liberty into slavery ignominious105. Machiavelli observes that a city used to freedom never forgets it106, and Macaulay sees him at the last struggle for Florentine liberty107. Schiller’s Swiss seek to keep ancient rights inviolate, not lawless innovation108. Goethe’s Alva retorts that true freedom is only to do right109. The American Declaration universalizes the claim as an unalienable right110, and Byron dies for Greece. Mazzini adds a modern doubt. Byron’s heroes are free but only free, wretched and isolated, and liberty must be harmonized with association111,112.
Finally there is slavery, the plainest loss of liberty. Woolman asserts liberty to be the natural right of all men equally113. Don Quixote declares it rigorous to enslave those God and nature made free114, though the slaves he frees promptly rob travellers115. Darwin indicts those who boast of liberty and uphold slavery116. Lincoln proclaims emancipation117, and Lowell hears the slave feel his manhood rise118. The fables keep the plain truth before us. Aesop’s wolf prefers hunger to the dog’s chain119, and Andersen’s nightingale has liberty in name only120. Shakespeare’s Ariel demands promised freedom121, while Caliban sings of freedom as he merely changes masters122.
Several questions remain open. Is liberty first an inward state or an outward condition? Does freedom need virtue to deserve it, or does it create virtue? Is the deepest danger the tyrant, or the majority? Milton’s Samson names the most troubling possibility, that corrupt nations love “bondage with ease” more than “strenuous liberty”123. Goldsmith states it more bluntly: liberty itself may be bartered for gold124.
Introductory essay written by Claude Opus 5.5 from the outline and the notes on every passage below; quotations are checked against this edition.
See also: Will 1b · Knowledge 5d · Cause 6a · Duty 1a
See also: Will 2a · Virtue and Vice 4d
See also: Beauty 9a · Education 1e · Opposition 3b · Nature 7c
See also: God 9c
See also: Desire 4d · Religion 4e
See also: Law 5b · Religion 8c
See also: Law 4b · Religion 12b
See also: Religion 13a
See also: Religion 13c
See also: Religion 12d
See also: Censorship 2a · Knowledge 8b · Punishment 9c · Opinion 10a
See also: Opinion 10b
See also: Opinion 10d
See also: Government 1c · Duty 8e
See also: Opinion 8b · Progress 6c · Custom and Convention 4a · Tyranny 6c
See also: Law 7c · State 3b · Tyranny 6c
See also: Diversion 11a · Education 5c
See also: Revolution 7b · Democracy 1d · Constitution 4b · National Character 3d
See also: Tyranny 8b · Revolution 7a · Hypocrisy 7a
See also: Citizen 2c · Religion 13c · Revolution 6c · Constitution 6e
See also: Constitution 2a · Taxation 2a · Government 3b
See also: Wealth 12d · Government 8a
See also: Tyranny 5c · Patriotism 4a · Race and Nationality 9a · Revolution 5c
See also: Monarchy 8a · Tyranny 4a
See also: War and Peace 10d
See also: Tyranny 9b · Race and Nationality 9a · Slavery 9c
See also: Government 4c
See also: Tyranny, Government, Constitution, Slavery, Law, Revolution