Government

Government is the oldest standing problem of men who live together. It covers the institution of rule and its forms, the offices through which rule is exercised, the powers it claims, and the relation between those who command and those who obey. Hobbes pictures sovereign, magistrates, counsellors, rewards and punishments as organs of one body politic¹. Burke calls government a contrivance of human wisdom to provide for human wants². Ruskin dismisses visible governments as toys or burdens of nations³. That such judgments can sit in the same set of books shows why the idea is a great one. Nearly every author here, whether poet, chronicler, statesman or economist, has to decide what rule is for, whence it comes, and how it fails.

The first question is whether government is needed at all. Most of these writers answer yes, and they give different reasons. Sophocles’ Creon declares anarchy the worst of evils⁴. Herodotus tells of Egyptians who could not live without a king and so divided their land among twelve⁵. Hobbes finds the inclination to obey a common power in fear of death and desire of ease⁶. Pope derives government from self-love itself, as safety restrains liberty⁷. The Federalist holds government indispensable and says men must cede some natural rights to it⁸. It also asks whether societies can found good government by reflection and choice, or must take it from accident and force⁹. Darwin, imagining an earthquake in England, sees how quickly authority fails and rapine follows once taxes cannot be collected¹⁰. Lincoln adds that no proper government provides for its own termination¹¹.

On the end of government there is wide agreement that it is the good of the whole, though the whole is variously conceived. Confucius ranks the people’s trust above food and troops alike^12,13. Luther charges rulers to seek their subjects’ good, on pain of condemnation¹⁴. Vane insists that government is ordained for the people and not for the rulers’ private benefit¹⁵, and that the sword must serve the public welfare through impartial administration¹⁶. Penn states flatly that the end of government is the good of the whole¹⁷. Rousseau says rulers were instituted to protect lives, liberties and properties¹⁸. Burke gives the end a sharper edge: government opposes sovereign reason to the will and caprice of rulers and ruled alike¹⁹. Emerson begins with persons and property²⁰, but names the culture of men as the highest end²¹.

Emerson also states most boldly the contrary thesis, that the least government is best. He calls force a practical lie²² and formal government a shabby imitation of the wise man’s character²³. Governments founded on force are tolerated only because men lack faith that society could stand without them²⁴. He reports a growing conviction that “the world is governed too much”²⁵. The doctrine has older echoes. Confucius praises Shun, who ruled by doing nothing²⁶, and Goldsmith doubts that laws or kings cause or cure much human suffering²⁷. Channing warns against deifying political institutions²⁸. Mill takes the question up more cautiously. He admits that no settled principle yet decides when interference is proper²⁹. He thinks English hostility to interference often misplaced³⁰, yet holds that restraint beyond police regulation belongs to paternal or despotic government³¹.

If government is a trust, it is open to criticism. Milton argues that errors befall good and bad governments alike, and that a magistrate’s virtue lies in redressing them quickly³². Confucius’ sage kings take blame for the people upon themselves³³. Sydney Smith presses the point hardest. He holds that no virtue in governors makes good institutions dispensable³⁴, and that trustees should be presumed liable to abuse³⁵. Criticizing rulers is no hostility to government, he argues, any more than criticizing a guardian attacks guardianship³⁶. Lowering governors in public esteem is the road to improvement, not to dissolution³⁷.

The origin of rulers’ authority divides the authors more sharply. Luther holds that the secular sword is borne by God’s ordinance and must punish even a guilty pope³⁸. Bacon calls government God’s ordinance and condemns its subversion³⁹, and Winthrop names governments God’s vicegerents⁴⁰. Vane joins divine institution to popular trust⁴¹. Burke, though reverent, denies that monarchy has more divine sanction than any other form⁴², and Rousseau sets divine right aside to reason from nature⁴³. The more naturalistic accounts stress force and chance. Pascal imagines strife until the stronger dominate, with succession then fixed by caprice^44,45. Rousseau calls early government the work of chance, repaired piecemeal⁴⁶. He denies, however, that it began as arbitrary power, which he treats as its corruption⁴⁷, and he traces three stages of inequality ending in master and slave⁴⁸. Milton’s Adam learns that men lived under paternal rule until one usurped power⁴⁹, since God gave man dominion over beasts but not over men⁵⁰. Carlyle, against brute force, says men yield to moral greatness⁵¹.

Consent is the modern answer. The Declaration derives just powers from the consent of the governed⁵². Rousseau holds the contract of government revocable when a chief breaks it⁵³. Vane places sovereignty in the people, exercised by deputation⁵⁴, and Mill would make magistrates revocable delegates of the nation’s power⁵⁵. Lincoln calls the Chief Magistrate a trustee who must hand the government on unimpaired⁵⁶. Burke rejects all this as a programme: Price’s rights to choose, cashier and frame governors⁵⁷ would leave no government standing if “misconduct” sufficed for removal⁵⁸. Obedience itself remains contested. Antigone dramatizes whether a ruler may disregard his subjects’ judgment⁵⁹. Bacon thinks obedience that construes commands rather than executing them is suspect⁶⁰, and Goethe’s Egmont counsels submission, since power lies with the king⁶¹. Woolman, by contrast, fears that conscientious refusal of war taxes will be read as disloyalty⁶². Lear’s dog obeyed in office mocks the whole claim⁶³.

The comparison of forms runs from classification to relativism. Machiavelli divides all states into republics and principalities⁶⁴. Rousseau ties forms to degrees of original inequality⁶⁵. Burke judges simple governments defective because man and society are complex⁶⁶. Emerson makes form the expression of a people’s cultivation^67,68, and Mill concludes that institutions rest on the strongest social power and are relative, not absolute⁶⁹. The mixed constitution wins most praise. Voltaire admires an English government that restrains the prince from evil while leaving him power to do good⁷⁰, and traces its growth into the harmony of King, Lords and Commons⁷¹. Burke defends limited monarchy as a third way between two despotisms⁷². Winthrop calls Massachusetts a limited mixed aristocracy⁷³, and Harrison describes England governed by prince, gentlemen and yeomen⁷⁴. Tennyson celebrates freedom broadening from precedent to precedent⁷⁵, while Dana finds California an arbitrary democracy without a judiciary⁷⁶. Others set form aside altogether. Pope holds that whatever is best administered is best⁷⁷. Burke proposes population as a sure test of a government’s effects⁷⁸, and Austin, as Mill reports, placed security in an enlightened people⁷⁹. Lowell finds healing in conscience rather than in any constitution⁸⁰, adding that only a perfectly wise and good despot would survive cross-examination⁸¹.

That longing for a single ruler recurs. Dante pictures Italy as a horse without a rider⁸². Plutarch shows Pericles holding Athens’ empire in his hands⁸³, and Rome accepting Caesar for respite from civil war⁸⁴. Carlyle praises Roman dictatorship and Cromwell’s Protectorate as purifying⁸⁵. Tennyson cries for one strong man who dare not lie⁸⁶. Lowell finds Lincoln absolute yet the incarnate common sense of the people⁸⁷. Manzoni gives the emergency dictator a plague hospital governed by a friar⁸⁸, and calls the expedient a mark of an ill-regulated society⁸⁹.

What makes a ruler fit? Confucius answers with self-rule and example: the ruler’s virtue bends the people as wind bends grass⁹⁰, and he who cannot rule himself cannot rule others⁹¹. Jesus makes the chief one who serves⁹². Marcus Aurelius admires watchfulness, frugality and indifference to applause⁹³. Burke allows no qualification but virtue and wisdom⁹⁴. Penn calls the people the prince’s politic wife, managed by wisdom rather than force⁹⁵, and Goethe sees order working downward from rulers⁹⁶. High place has its costs: Bacon calls its holders thrice servants⁹⁷, Demosthenes warns youth off politics⁹⁸, and Emerson says the President pays dearly⁹⁹. Machiavelli separates the art of holding power from virtue. He advises the conqueror to extinguish the old line while keeping laws and taxes¹⁰⁰, and he prefers colonies to garrisons¹⁰¹. He judges that fostered factions never do good¹⁰², and that the best fortress is not to be hated¹⁰³. Macaulay notes that the same principles explain the rise of a man and of a people¹⁰⁴. Bacon adds the management of rumour¹⁰⁵ and of hope¹⁰⁶. Abuse is catalogued as well. The Declaration lists executive usurpations¹⁰⁷. Prospero lost his state by neglecting it¹⁰⁸, and Manzoni’s governor ignored the plague for the war¹⁰⁹.

Counsel is the ruler’s chief resource and danger. Confucius bids ministers withstand their lord to his face¹¹⁰. More’s Hythloday doubts that counsel at court can do anything but further folly¹¹¹, though More urges that the ship of state not be forsaken¹¹². Machiavelli and Penn agree that princes answer for their choice of ministers^113,114, and Penn denies that government needs knaves¹¹⁵. Councils have their own procedure. Cicero praises the counsel of the aged¹¹⁶, and Tacitus records German assemblies deciding great matters¹¹⁷. Bacon prescribes deliberation over a day and the use of committees¹¹⁸, while Hobbes thinks an assembly with veto powers unfit to govern¹¹⁹. Darwin finds good sense in a Tahitian parliament¹²⁰. Lowell judges government by discussion safer than force, even when it is gabble¹²¹. Faction troubles all. Bacon would have the sovereign carry factions as the primum mobile carries inferior orbs¹²². Washington thinks party spirit especially dangerous in elective governments¹²³, and Emerson finds parties rooted in real interests but corrupted by leaders¹²⁴. Plutarch shows demagogues rising after Pericles¹²⁵, and Burke sees popular leaders becoming flatterers rather than legislators¹²⁶.

The integrity of office receives practical treatment. Penn lists the qualities of a good officer and asks for sufficient salaries without bribes^127,128. Bacon warns against delay, corruption, roughness and facility¹²⁹, and Smith wants reward proportioned to diligence¹³⁰. Dante damns magistrates who were chosen for impartiality and ruled partially¹³¹. Sainte-Beuve admires Montaigne’s quiet, preventive mayoralty¹³². Provincial rule tests these virtues. Cicero contrasts his clean administration with Appius’s plunder¹³³. Pliny would win authority by affection rather than terror¹³⁴, and Trajan refuses a fire company for fear of associations¹³⁵. Franklin records the wearying quarrels of proprietary governors and assemblies¹³⁶. Egmont argues that natives govern better than strangers¹³⁷, and Smith finds that trader and sovereign are inconsistent characters¹³⁸. The ship offers a model. Dana holds that it needs one head, armed with emergency powers checked by accountability¹³⁹, and that severity breeds discontent and discontent breeds severity¹⁴⁰. Burke says armies will not obey a captive king or a transient assembly¹⁴¹.

Centralization is a modern worry. Smith judges local management of works cheaper and its abuses more corrigible¹⁴². Mill fears a bureaucracy that monopolizes talent, as in Russia¹⁴³. He proposes the greatest dissemination of power consistent with efficiency¹⁴⁴, and calls the union of popular control with skilled agency the great problem of modern organization¹⁴⁵. Schiller sees the statesman grown narrow-hearted by formulas¹⁴⁶. Manzoni dramatizes administrative helplessness most fully. Proclamations attest only impotence¹⁴⁷, and decrees beget decrees^148,149. Magistrates stand helpless while the governor attends to war¹⁵⁰. Burke shows revolutionary France unable even to collect taxes from Lyons¹⁵¹.

Constitutional writers seek to make such failure structural rather than personal. Vane proposes separating executive from legislative power¹⁵², and Washington forbids departments to encroach on one another¹⁵³. Burke praises an irresponsible crown with responsible ministers¹⁵⁴, and condemns a French executive responsible without discretion¹⁵⁵. He holds that an assembly’s character depends on the men who compose it¹⁵⁶. Long notes that Marcus Aurelius was bound by senate and precedent¹⁵⁷. The Constitution’s veto and reserved powers^158,159 and Connecticut’s General Court¹⁶⁰ embody the design. Marshall argues that a limited Union is supreme within its sphere and free to choose its means^161,162. Representation itself is debated. Mill hails Hare’s system¹⁶³, while Burns satirizes bought elections¹⁶⁴ and Emerson finds English politics ruled by class¹⁶⁵.

In economics Smith speaks almost alone, and decisively. He argues that statesmen who direct private capital assume an authority no one could safely hold¹⁶⁶. Kings who police private expense are themselves the greatest spendthrifts¹⁶⁷, and the sovereign cannot wisely superintend industry¹⁶⁸. He would have the sovereign secure communications and free markets¹⁶⁹. Even a bad sovereign pities his people more than tax farmers do¹⁷⁰, and public debt has enfeebled every great state¹⁷¹. On relief, Mill prefers voluntary associations to state action¹⁷². Channing and Carlyle, the latter as Emerson reports him, demand public health and work for the poor^173,174.

The relation of civil to spiritual authority runs from Dante’s lament that the sword grafted on the crook ruins both¹⁷⁵, through Luther’s subjection of the pope to temporal authority outside spiritual things^176,177. It continues in Vane’s confinement of the magistrate to outward wrongs¹⁷⁸ and in Calvin’s acknowledgment of civil government as God’s blessing¹⁷⁹. Hobbes sees legislators using fear of the gods to secure obedience¹⁸⁰, and Voltaire finds that many religions produce peace¹⁸¹. Mill credits the separation of the two powers with limiting interference in private life¹⁸², and rejects Comte’s spiritual authority as a safeguard¹⁸³.

Finally, government lives in history. Virgil’s Rome would spare the conquered and subdue the proud¹⁸⁴. Smith contrasts independent Greek colonies with subject Roman ones¹⁸⁵. Emerson and Mill welcome colonial self-government^186,187, and Freeman wants political boundaries to fit nations where they can¹⁸⁸. States also decay. Plutarch’s Rome is a ship without a pilot¹⁸⁹, and Socrates thinks an honest man cannot survive in public life¹⁹⁰. Darwin’s republics change governors endlessly¹⁹¹. Penn warns that unjust means bring convulsions¹⁹². Burke’s standard is to preserve while improving¹⁹³, and he held the old French government fit for reform rather than destruction¹⁹⁴. Johnson’s proclamation states that the overcome must be conciliated¹⁹⁵.

Several questions remain open. Is form indifferent, or does form shape the men who administer it? Is government a divine trust, a contract, or a historical growth? Should it shrink toward Emerson’s self-governing individual, or extend its care as Channing and Carlyle urge? Mill’s problem of joining popular control to skilled administration is perhaps the clearest statement of what these books leave unresolved.