Chapter 23
Duty and obligation; what one ought to do; conscience and the moral law.
1071 passages · 341 principal · Covers the 49 volumes of primary texts
Duty is the idea of what one ought to do: the claim that binds a person whether or not he wishes it, and the conscience that registers that claim within. It is a great idea for these books because nearly every one of them presupposes it, and many argue openly about it. The Preacher sums up “the whole duty of man” as fearing God and keeping his commandments1. Epictetus’s student asks what he owes to gods, parents, brothers, country and strangers2. Taine finds in English literature a conception of duty erected into absolute sovereign of life3. Carlyle laments that the answer to the question of man’s duties, once “ready written,” has been lost4. Between these poles lie the main questions. What is duty, and on what does it rest? Does moral worth lie in the motive? Is conscience a sure guide? And what is to be done when one duty collides with another?
The most rigorous answer to the first question in these volumes is Kant’s. Duty, he says, is “the necessity of acting from respect for the law,” and its worth lies in the maxim of the act, not in the result5. Its necessity is absolute and rests a priori on pure reason, not on human nature or circumstance6. It cannot be drawn from experience, since reason commands what ought to happen even if it has never happened7. For a will that is not perfectly rational, the objective law appears as an imperative, an “ought”8,9. The moral imperative is categorical. Unlike rules of skill or prudence, it commands without condition10: act only on a maxim you could will as universal law11, and treat humanity always as an end12.
Kant holds that earlier moralists failed because they grounded duty in interest. What they produced was never duty, only the necessity of acting from interest13. The person who submits to the law nonetheless has dignity, because he is also its legislator14. The “ought” arises from our belonging both to a sensible world and to an intelligible one15. Kant concedes, however, that he cannot finally explain why the moral law obliges16. Its necessity cannot be derived from any interest without ceasing to be moral17. Hobbes had defined the matter differently. For him obligation is simply a law binding one to a course, and so it is the opposite of liberty18.
From this account follows Kant’s severe teaching on motive. The honest tradesman who is honest because it pays acts in accord with duty but not from it19. Kindness that springs from sympathy lacks true moral worth, while the cold man who helps from duty alone shows the highest worth20. Kant even doubts that any example proves an act was done from pure duty rather than hidden interest21.
Schiller accepts that in morality sensuous impulse must determine nothing22. Yet he observes that the law appears to sensuous man as an alien constraint until he recognizes reason as his true self23, and that duty ceases to coerce when inclination attracts24. Wordsworth’s Ode addresses Duty as a stern lawgiver whom the poet freely chooses to serve25. Ruskin, more practically, asks his audience whether duty or love of praise moves them more, and they admit duty only as a secondary motive26.
That duty should be done for its own sake is far older than Kant, though the reasons differ. The Gita bids Arjuna act rightly for right’s sake and not for the fruit of deeds27. He is to do his allotted task free from desire28, and one who acts detached, when bidden, is not bound even in slaying29. Marcus Aurelius holds that it makes no difference whether he is cold or warm, praised or dying, so long as he does his duty30. Benevolence, he says, is its own reward, as the eye asks no payment for seeing31. Lessing looks to a time when man will do the right because it is right, not for arbitrary rewards32, and he praises an obedience that keeps God’s laws because they are His33. Luther’s believer also serves without seeking merit, but he does so out of grateful love for a gift already given34,35. In the Crito, Socrates sets aside talk of money and children as the doctrines of the multitude: the only question is whether the act is right36. Detachment, love and rational respect are three different routes to the same refusal of reward.
A rival conception locates duty in one’s nature or station. The Gita teaches that it is better to do one’s own task imperfectly than another’s well37,38. A warrior who shuns lawful war sins39. Marcus rises from his bed to the work of a human being40 and asks each being to act according to its constitution41. Luther gives each man a proper task whose fulfilment is itself prayer42, and Emerson writes that “duty is our place”43.
The Stoics give this conception its most famous figure, the soldier at his post. Socrates will stay where he is stationed and consider only right and wrong44. Epictetus would die a thousand deaths rather than desert the post God assigns45, since life is a warfare under a Commander46. From the same image comes the prohibition of suicide. In the Phaedo, man is a prisoner who may not run away47, a servant bound to his master to the end48. Kant reaches the same conclusion by another road: suicide uses a person merely as a means49. The figure of the post survives in modern settings. Tennyson’s Grenville dies saying he only did his duty50. Manzoni’s Federigo urges his clergy to abandon life rather than their flock during the plague51. Dana’s sailor stays at his post despite a swollen face and no sleep52.
Many authors hold that the sense of “ought” is given in man before any teaching. Sidney says natural conscience knows it is good to do well without philosophers’ words53. Rousseau argues that men knew their duties before books existed54. Emerson writes that man knows “he ought” though analysis cannot account for it55.
Here the question passes to conscience. Rousseau calls it a divine instinct, an infallible judge, independent of reason56, whose rules are written on the heart57 and which makes the apparatus of moral philosophy unnecessary58. Milton’s God places Conscience in men as “umpire”59. Long reports Butler’s view that conscience is naturally supreme over our affections60. Arnold, doubting any judge in heaven, still bids man obey the inward judge61. Conscience also accuses. It drives Milton’s Adam into horrors62, while Antonio in The Tempest can find no conscience in his bosom63. Carlyle goes further and calls a clear conscience a solecism, since the good man simply does good64.
Is conscience infallible? The texts dispute it. Paul asks the strong to spare the weaker brother’s stumbling conscience65. Pascal warns that casuists cannot reassure an erring conscience and counsels choosing good guides66. À Kempis says conscience alone does not suffice without humility67. Channing notes that cruel deeds have been done from a mistaken sense of duty68. Mill observes that acting from duty did not excuse the inquisitors69, and he offers the sharpest irony in these books. Marcus Aurelius, the Stoic of duty, persecuted Christianity under a solemn sense of duty to society70.
Yet conscience, however fallible, is what sets the individual against power. Thomas More asks release from office rather than act against conscience, serving God first and the King after71. He will not conform his conscience to one realm’s council against Christendom72. Woolman holds it the duty of all to be firm in what they certainly know is right73. He refuses to write instruments of slavery74 and to pay a war tax even though respected Friends pay it75. Antigone obeys divine law rather than a man’s decree76. Peter answers the council that God must be obeyed rather than men77. Socrates, too, obeys the god before the city78 and refused an unjust command79. Yet the same Socrates, in the Crito, holds that country and laws are owed more than a father, so that one must obey or persuade80,81. Washington likewise calls obedience to established government the duty of every individual82. How to reconcile the inward voice with lawful authority is left unsettled.
The same tension governs the duties of subjects and servants. Wiglaf reminds the retainers that their lord’s gifts must be repaid with service83. Roland says the vassal must suffer heat, cold and peril for his lord84. Confucius’s statesman withdraws rather than obey in murder85. Johnson allows that a subordinate need not examine his superior’s conduct, except that he must not become an instrument of wickedness86. Kent holds that duty must speak plainly against flattery87, whereas Tennyson’s troopers are “not to reason why”88. Schiller’s Fürst argues that enforced duties lapse where no good was received, since love must be free89.
Where the command is divine, obedience can cost the heart itself. Aeneas obeys the gods against his inclination and leaves Dido90. Pylades reminds Orestes that the hate of men is better than the hate of gods91. Corneille’s Pauline lets duty reign as queen, though it breaks her heart92.
Civic duty has its own literature. Adam Smith limits the sovereign to three duties: defence, justice, and public works that no individual would maintain93. More argues that a learned man should counsel princes even at personal cost94, and Confucius that a gentleman takes office at the call of right even in a lost cause95. Washington sacrificed inclination to duty96. Mill took up work in Parliament that others would not97, and he judged that civic obligation comes to us from Greece and Rome rather than from Christian ethics98.
Public duty can override private attachment. Brutus, as consul and not as father, sheds his sons’ blood99. But the books also show that maxim abused. Samson rejects Dalila’s plea that private respects must yield to the public good100, and Tartuffe invokes duty to the prince in order to sacrifice friend and kindred101.
Friendship has duties and limits. Cicero’s first law of friendship is neither to ask nor to consent to wrong102. Cervantes’s Lothario holds that true friends may not ask what offends God103. Montaigne, by contrast, thinks perfect friends lose all sense of obligation between them104. The ballad of Christy and Bewick sets father against sworn friend, and Christy fears sin whichever he chooses105.
Promises receive careful analysis. Hobbes holds that covenants extorted by fear still bind106 and that an oath adds nothing to an obligation107. Mill grants that promises create obligations that may be overruled but never simply ignored108. Luther binds faith even toward enemies109, and the king in Grimm insists that a promise must be performed110. Dante holds that a vow must be kept, yet cites Jephthah’s rash vow fulfilled by a worse deed111. Manzoni asks whether Lucia’s vow can dispose of a will already pledged to Renzo112. He also leaves openly to the reader whether general moral rules admit exceptions113.
Duties to neighbour begin, for Confucius, with one word, fellow-feeling: not doing to others what one would not have done to oneself114. Augustine finds the same rule recorded in conscience115. Don Quixote’s knighthood exists to defend widows and orphans116, and Ruskin sends women down among the suffering poor117. Mill, however, distinguishes the duties society may enforce, such as giving evidence or rescuing the defenceless118, from duties to oneself, which are not socially obligatory119. Emerson goes further. Duty is judged by one’s own consciousness, not by the popular code120, and he refuses the claimed obligation to help all poor men121.
Finally, the professions show duty at work in particular callings. Federigo tells the timid curate Abbondio that a priest’s duty admits no exemption for danger122. He will be asked not whether he overcame the powerful but whether he did what was required of him123. Hippocrates binds the physician by oath to teachers and patients124. Holmes holds that duty to society overrides professional loyalty when physicians carry infection125. Descartes feels bound to publish for mankind’s good126, and Mill says a thinker’s first duty is to follow his intellect wherever it leads127. Carlyle’s counsel is simply to do what lies at hand with all one’s might128.
Whether duty rests on reason, on God, on nature or on station, and whether conscience can be trusted against law, these texts leave open. Lowell’s line marks the modern condition: new occasions teach new duties129.
Introductory essay written by Claude Opus 5.5 from the outline and the notes on every passage below; quotations are checked against this edition.
See also: Will 5 · Liberty 1b · Reasoning 7e · Law 3b
See also: Labor 1d · Religion 14d
See also: Nature 3a
See also: Soul 6
See also: Religion 12e · Slavery 8b
See also: Will 2a
See also: Slavery 8b · Religion 4e
See also: Taxation 4c · War and Peace 2d
See also: Honor 5a · Life and Death 8c · Chivalry 3b
See also: Government 6c
See also: Family 3c
See also: Family 4b
See also: Friendship 8a · Virtue and Vice 6e
See also: Wealth 6b
See also: Chivalry 5b
See also: Liberty 6a
See also: Law 2c
See also: Religion 9b
See also: Family 3b
See also: Friendship 8b
See also: Religion 10a · Courage 5d · Charity 1a
See also: Medicine 8c