Friendship

Friendship covers a cluster of human bonds. There is the intimate pairing of two persons, the wider circle of companions, the comrade in a common cause, and the guest at table. With them come the duties these bonds impose and the ways they fail. It is a great idea for these books because few other subjects are treated both by formal argument and in story. Cicero, Montaigne, Bacon and Emerson each devote a whole treatise or essay to it. Homer, Virgil, Cervantes, Shakespeare and Dryden make friendship the hinge of their plots. Letters, autobiographies and elegies record particular friendships as they were actually lived and lost. Throughout, the same questions recur: what a friend is, why we have friends, what we owe them, and where friendship must yield.

The most persistent definition makes the friend a second self. Cicero calls friendship accord on all things joined with goodwill, a bond that shares joy and halves sorrow¹, and names the friend another self whose memory survives death². Augustine, grieving a dead companion, calls him half of his soul, one soul in two bodies³. Bacon makes the friend “another himself” who speaks where one cannot⁴. Penn speaks of a union of spirits and a marriage of hearts⁵, and Browne of two souls made one⁶. Montaigne pushes the idea furthest. In perfect friendship souls blend so completely that his love for La Boétie admits no reason beyond because it was he, because it was I⁷. Benefits and obligations dissolve because all things are common⁸. Such a friendship, he holds, cannot be divided among several persons⁹. Poetry supplies the emblems: Nisus and Euryalus share one care and one hazard and die together^10,11, and Sidney cites them as a virtue poetry makes visible¹². The very height of the ideal invites doubt. Swift ranks the true friend among things so demanding that they subsist only in idea¹³, and Emerson calls the friend a paradox and the masterpiece of nature¹⁴.

To define friendship the authors set it against neighbouring bonds. Montaigne holds that parent and child, or brothers, lack the equality and free communication friendship needs. He also contrasts the steady, tempered heat of friendship with the feverish fire of sexual love^15,16, and he thinks neither marriage nor Greek love can satisfy its requirement of a lasting, free bond¹⁷. Cicero ranks friendship above kinship because affection can be removed from kinship but not from friendship¹⁸, and Browne would die for a friend, ranking friends before kin¹⁹. Augustine confesses that he clouded the bright boundary of friendship with the fog of lust^20,21. Bacon distinguishes nuptial love, which makes mankind, from friendly love, which perfects it²², and wryly notes that unmarried men make the best friends²³. The moderns, however, increasingly find friendship within marriage. Penn advises choosing a wife as friend and second self²⁴. Mill describes the confidential friendship with Harriet Taylor that preceded their marriage, two minds so joined that their writings became a joint product²⁵.

That friendship answers a natural need is almost universally granted. The Preacher says two are better than one, for the solitary man’s toil is vanity²⁶. Cicero holds that nature abhors isolation, so that even the misanthrope needs someone to share with²⁷. Bacon calls a man unfit for friendship beast-like and closed men “cannibals of their own hearts”^28,29. Hume states flatly that friendship is the chief joy of human life³⁰, and Burke argues from the pain of total solitude that we are made for fellowship³¹. The Stoics widen the bond to embrace all rational beings. For Epictetus the world is full of friends, gods and men alike³². Marcus Aurelius holds that even those who obstruct us are by nature kinsmen and friends^33,34. More’s Utopians trust natural fellowship over treaties³⁵, Pope pictures benevolence widening outward from the friend³⁶, and Lincoln pleads that sections of one nation, like friends, keep laws more easily than aliens make treaties³⁷.

On the ground of friendship the controversy is old and sharp. Cicero denies that friendship springs from need. It begins in admiration of virtue, the self-sufficient seek it most, and advantage follows friendship rather than causing it^38,39. He concludes that friendship can exist only among good men¹⁸. Epictetus likewise finds it only where the will holds the good in common, and not in kinship or long companionship⁴⁰. Augustine says he loved his friends for themselves alone⁴¹. Against this stands a line of writers who treat friends as instruments. Hobbes counts friends as power, united strengths procured by liberality⁴². Machiavelli advises a prince to be a staunch friend and thorough foe⁴³, yet warns that friendships bought with money fail in need⁴⁴, a concession Cicero might welcome. Adam Smith observes that a lifetime scarcely wins the friendship of a few, so men must appeal to self-interest instead⁴⁵. Massinger’s Overreach declares friendship “but a word”⁴⁶. Likeness is the other proposed ground. Confucius counsels having no friends unlike oneself⁴⁷, and Mill makes agreement on cardinal convictions requisite⁴⁸. Emerson, by contrast, wants a mean between likeness and unlikeness, a friend who is no echo⁴⁹, and Browne holds that differences of opinion should not divide affection⁵⁰. Christian writers find the ground in God. Augustine’s early friend was not yet a true friend, since only love in God cements friendship, and he who loves his friend in God loses none dear^51,52. Penn adds that friends who love in the divine principle cannot be separated by death⁵³. In practice friendships form humbly. They grow from shared work⁵⁴, from a common road⁵⁵, and from natural pity fixed on one object⁵⁶. Franklin even wins a rival’s friendship by asking to borrow a book⁵⁷.

Choice of friends therefore demands care. Cicero laments that men choose friends carelessly. He would test them by tentative friendship, wait for character to mature, and look above all for constancy^58,59. Yet he condemns the maxim to love a friend as a future enemy⁶⁰. Confucius names three helpful and three harmful kinds of friends⁶¹, and his disciples debate whether to push the unworthy away or bear with many⁶². Polonius would grapple tried friends with hoops of steel⁶³, Goethe’s doctor would eat a bushel of salt with a new acquaintance⁶⁴, and Webster’s Delio holds that old friends, like old swords, are trusted best⁶⁵. Cicero too prefers old friends, like aged wine⁶⁶. Emerson alone insists that friends are self-elected rather than chosen⁶⁷. Bad company is the reverse case. Augustine would not have stolen the pears alone, and he calls such fellowship “friendship too unfriendly”⁶⁸. Antony’s friend Curio leads him into debt⁶⁹, and Franklin’s boyhood friend Collins sinks into drink and burdens him⁷⁰.

What friends owe begins with practical help. Crito would be shamed for valuing money above a friend’s life⁷¹. Cicero tells the superior friend to descend and raise the other, and the giver never to recount his services⁷². Pliny sells land cheaply out of old friendship⁷³. In Lessing, Werner argues that friends’ goods are common⁷⁴ while Tellheim’s pride resists the debt⁷⁵. Emerson, characteristically, finds service trivial beside goodwill⁷⁶. The weightier duty is frankness. Cicero holds that friends must give and accept reproof, since compliance ruins a friend⁷⁷. Bacon prizes a friend’s counsel as purer than self-counsel⁷⁸, Sidney calls Nathan’s rebuke of David the tenderest office of a friend⁷⁹, and Emerson makes truth the first element of friendship⁸⁰. Woolman admonishes an older friend at inward cost⁸¹ and warns that a mere face of friendship stifles honest speech⁸². Descartes adds a sceptical note: friends’ partiality hides our faults from them⁸³. The flatterer is the counterfeit of the frank friend. Cicero calls flattery subversive of friendship⁸⁴, Augustine sets flattering friends who pervert against reproachful enemies who correct⁸⁵, and Machiavelli warns princes to guard against flatterers⁸⁶. Dryden’s Antony at last knows that Ventidius loves him because he never flattered his vices⁸⁷.

Confidence is a further duty, and a fragile one. Cardenio confides in Don Fernando under the “law of amity” to conceal nothing, and that trust leads to his betrayal⁸⁸. Manzoni wryly observes that the chain of confidential friends spreads any secret to everyone⁸⁹. Pascal thinks there would not be four friends in the world if each knew what the others said of him⁹⁰, and Burns advises keeping something back even from a bosom crony⁹¹. Kant answers that sincerity in friendship remains a duty even if no sincere friend had ever existed⁹². In sickness and death the duties grow tender. Job’s friends sit silent with him seven days⁹³. Elpenor’s ghost begs burial from his companion⁹⁴. Cicero nurses Tiro and reflects that genuine love, like gold, is proved by fire⁹⁵. Hamlet charges Horatio to live and tell his story⁹⁶, and the dying Herbert commits his family to Woodnot “by the religion of our friendship”⁹⁷.

Fortune is the great test. The hare with many friends finds none in danger⁹⁸, and Job’s brethren fail him like dried brooks⁹⁹. Cicero holds that tyrants have only fair-weather friends¹⁰⁰. The ruined Nur-ed-Din is refused by every companion he feasted¹⁰¹, and Andersen’s soldier loses his friends with his money¹⁰². Shakespeare’s Player King states the law that friendship follows fortune¹⁰³, and Samson calls false friends counterfeit coin¹⁰⁴. Against them stand the loyal. The Chorus refuses to abandon Prometheus¹⁰⁵. Ventidius chooses to die beside Antony rather than betray him¹⁰⁶. Browning’s Guendolen insists that true friendship stands by the fallen¹⁰⁷, and Schiller’s Hedwig scorns idle tears in place of active loyalty¹⁰⁸. Antigone’s line, “I do not love a friend who loves in words,” compresses the whole test¹⁰⁹. Its failure leaves friendlessness, the depth of misery: Job forgotten by his familiars¹¹⁰, Antigone dying unwept¹¹¹, Macbeth without troops of friends¹¹², and Christ seeking comfort from friends who sleep¹¹³.

Betrayal by a friend wounds most. The psalmist finds a familiar friend’s treachery worse than an enemy’s¹¹⁴. Decimus Brutus, Caesar’s trusted heir, leads him by the hand to death¹¹⁵. Cervantes dissects the slow overthrow of Lothario’s loyalty by passion until, in his own words, he has violated the holy laws of friendship^116,117. Dryden’s Antony can forgive a foe but not a friend, since treason is worst where trust is greatest¹¹⁸. False friendship is also deliberate. Hamlet’s schoolfellows are enlisted as spies^119,120, and Plato traces misanthropy to trust misplaced in supposed friends¹²¹. Lesser quarrels follow causes that Scipio lists in Cicero: rivalry for office, money, changed character and improper requests¹²². Paul and Barnabas part over Mark¹²³. Johnson laments how party faction ended Addison’s long friendship with Steele¹²⁴, and Coleridge shows youthful friends parted by whispering tongues¹²⁵. Cicero counsels that friendships be unstitched rather than torn¹²⁶. Edwardes sings that friends are never friends in deed until they fall out¹²⁷, and Stevenson finds that a look reconciles better than a letter¹²⁸.

The limits of friendship divide the authors most sharply. Cicero’s first law is that friends neither ask nor grant wrong. He refuses to excuse Blossius for following Gracchus into sedition^129,130. Montaigne defends that same Blossius as trusting a friend’s virtuous will¹³¹. Cervantes’s Lothario allows a friend’s claim only usque ad aras, as far as the altar¹³². Socrates gently tells Crito that affection cannot override principle¹³³. Aristides champions justice against friendship and favour¹³⁴, Drake executes his friend Doughty for the voyage’s sake¹³⁵, and Woolman warns that friendships with no immutable foundation must not excuse silence on slavery¹³⁶. Beyond justice lie conscience and self-reliance. Bunyan’s pilgrims leave friends who disown their faith¹³⁷. Emerson tells friends and kin he must live in truth¹³⁸ and holds that losing friends for truth gains better ones¹³⁹. At the extreme stands detachment. Diogenes holds friends loosely as gifts of the gods¹⁴⁰. Thomas à Kempis bids the soul resign a beloved friend for God’s sake and not grieve at desertion^141,142. The Gita’s beloved of God keeps an equal heart toward friend and foe¹⁴³. Emerson finds the truest union between friends living apart¹⁴⁴.

Fellowship and good company soften all this austerity. Cato values the banquet for its convivium, the living together, more than for its food¹⁴⁵. Augustine recalls the talk, jest and reading that melt souls into one¹⁴⁶. Milton invites friends to fireside mirth¹⁴⁷, Franklin’s Junto sets rules so that conversation does not disgust¹⁴⁸, and Bunyan’s Hopeful affirms that two are better than one on the road¹⁴⁹. Emerson, ever exacting, thinks three spoil sincere conversation¹⁵⁰. Last comes loss. Cicero’s Laelius argues that grief for a friend’s death betrays self-love¹⁵¹. Augustine finds every place hateful after his friend died¹⁵², and Montaigne feels himself only half alive¹⁵³. Burns’s “Auld Lang Syne” keeps old acquaintance in a cup of kindness¹⁵⁴. Emerson holds that such losses later prove compensations¹⁵⁵, while Penn believes friendship remains present and immortal in the divine¹⁵⁶.

Several questions remain open across these books. One is whether perfect friendship is singular, as Montaigne holds, or is a widening sympathy, as the Stoics and Pope imagine. Another is whether friendship is bounded by justice, as Cicero insists, or is a trust that overrides other duties, as Montaigne suggests. A third is whether the sage should cling to friends or hold them loosely. Ancients and moderns alike agree that friendship is among the highest goods. They have never agreed whether it can be fully trusted, or how much of oneself it may rightly claim.