Chapter 50
Judgment as an act of mind; discernment; judging well or ill; judgment in courts.
504 passages · 136 principal · Covers the 49 volumes of primary texts
Judgment names the act by which the mind pronounces upon things: that this is so, that this is better than that, that this man is honest or this poem fine or this defendant guilty. It belongs to logic as the completion of thought, to ethics as the condition of right action, to religion as the prerogative of God, to criticism as the judging of art and letters, and to law as the office of the judge. Few ideas in the Harvard Classics travel so widely. The same word serves the Stoic emperor examining his impressions, the connoisseur valuing a diamond, the juror weighing witnesses, and the sinner awaiting the last day. That breadth is the reason for treating it as a great idea: it shows a single human capacity at work in every province of life, and it raises in each the same doubt, whether we can trust it.
The moderns took the most pains to say what judgment is. Rousseau’s vicar holds that to perceive is merely to feel, whereas to compare and judge is an active power of an intelligent being1. The errors we make about the relation of two sticks show that judgment is a fallible operation of our own, distinct from sensation, which is always true2. Berkeley likewise places error not in what is immediately perceived but in wrong inference from it3. A second distinction, between judgment and wit, is drawn by Hobbes and repeated by Burke after Locke. Wit traces resemblances and judgment finds differences, and the perfect union of the two is rare4. Hobbes calls the discerning of differences good judgment, or discretion when it is exercised in affairs5. He makes it dominant in history, demonstration and counsel, while fancy serves only ornament6, and he adds that judgment without fancy is still wit, but fancy without judgment is not7. Hobbes also gives judgment a place at the end of inquiry: it is the last opinion in the search for truth, as will is the last appetite in deliberation8. Descartes would admit into judgment only what is presented clearly and distinctly9, and he calls good sense simply the power of judging aright10. Pascal complicates this rational picture. Intuition belongs to judgment, which perceives without rules, while mathematics belongs to intellect11, and the heart, too, judges in religion12.
The ancients cared less for this anatomy than for the moral weight of judgment. For the Stoics our troubles are judgments of our own adding. Epictetus says that misfortune is an addition each man makes13. Marcus Aurelius teaches that things express no judgment of themselves, and only the ruling faculty judges them14. The report that one has been insulted does not contain the further judgment that one has been injured15, and such judgments, being our own making, can be wiped out16,17. Descartes carries the point into conduct: right action requires only right judgment18. Rousseau agrees that bad choice follows false judgment19. Judgment so conceived stands above knowledge. Montaigne finds that knowledge and truth may exist without judgment, and that the frank acknowledgment of ignorance is its best testimony20. Penn says that judgment governs knowledge, for a thing may be right and yet not fit to be done21. Adam Smith finds more judgment and discretion in the despised ploughman, who must manage variable materials and weather, than in uniform trades22,23. Kant likewise ranks the practical judgment of common understanding above theoretical judgment24.
How is good judgment formed? Montaigne answers that it is enlightened by commerce with men and the world25. Johnson holds that it improves by practice and is hindered by dictatorial decisions, so he offers readers only enough criticism to find the rest themselves26. Pascal prizes rules: to judge by rule is to carry a watch, while those without one judge by whim27. Yet he knows that judgment errs when too near or too far from its object, and he asks what fixes the right point of view in matters of truth, as perspective fixes it in painting28. Penn wants retirement from the world’s hurry and a clear head29,30. Mill values deliberate judgment formed at a distance31, and he insists that the rare faculty of weighing two sides requires that both be advocated32. Education follows from these views. Montaigne would have the pupil judge histories rather than merely know them33. Locke would teach him to judge men by revealing marks, not outside show34, and he warns that disputation spoils judgment35.
Judging persons is the oldest form of the art. Confucius says to judge a man by his acts, motives and pleasures, for he cannot hide36. Cicero counsels judging before loving37, and Epictetus likens discerning good men to testing coin, a skill that letters cannot supply38. Machiavelli ranks a prince by whether he can tell good servants from bad39. Penn warns that judging other men’s motives by one’s own is a lottery40. Comedy delights in the failures of this art. Sir Peter in Sheridan insists he was never mistaken while Joseph deceives him41, and Sir Oliver more wisely plans a trial of his nephews’ hearts42. Where persons cannot be tested, judges must be recognized. Swift never heard Stella judge wrongly of persons, books or affairs43, and Darwin notes that doubtful species are ranked by the majority of competent naturalists44.
The causes of false judgment are catalogued with remarkable agreement. Pascal says that disease and self-interest spoil judgment, so no man should judge his own cause45, and that the mind sees only the aspect the will likes46. Penn finds that passion deprives us of judgment47 and that partiality makes us blame in others what we excuse in ourselves48. Dante says affection bends judgment to its ply49. In Plutarch passion stifles Antony’s judgment50, and the Federalist recognizes that many causes bias even wise and good men51. Haste is the other enemy. Augustine’s Alypius, seized as a thief, learns that no man should be condemned out of rash credulity52. Dante warns the people not to judge crops while they are green53, and Pascal will not judge a man’s capacity by a single good remark54. Manzoni’s Prassede reads Lucia’s shyness as wilfulness55, and Darwin observes that first impressions of Tahiti depend on the ideas the traveller brought56.
Beneath these particular errors lies a general doubt. Montaigne finds his own judgment uncertain and groping57. Pascal thinks judgment rarely firm, so that even submitting a matter to another prejudices it by our manner of presenting it58. Johnson grants that long approbation may be mere fashion59. Mill gives the modern resolution: fallible judgment must still be acted upon60, and its value lies in its being correctable, so that reliance is justified only while the means of correction remain at hand61. From this follow two duties that are in tension: to suspend judgment and to judge for oneself. Pascal suspends judgment on inconceivable propositions until the opposite is shown manifestly false62. Mill holds that one who does not know the opposing reasons should suspend judgment63. Bacon asks readers to judge his method only after trial, and then as their own masters64. Channing urges the individual to judge religion for himself65. Paré holds to his opinion alone against many consultants66. Emerson’s Sir John, who refuses to hear evidence lest it unsettle him, shows the vice that suspension can become67.
In morals and religion the question changes: not how to judge well but whether to judge at all. The Gospel forbids it, and bids the hypocrite remove the beam from his own eye68,69. The Stoic reaches a similar caution by a different road. Marcus Aurelius thinks that judging another’s act rightly requires learning much, since acts depend on circumstances70. Thomas à Kempis71,72, Browne, who holds that none truly knows another or himself73, and Burns, who pleads that only the maker of the heart can try it74, develop the Christian counsel. Self-judgment is the alternative. Pascal would judge himself so that God need not at the last day75. Bunyan’s right self-judgment agrees with the Word’s76, and Manzoni’s Unnamed hears a new inner voice judging his former life77. Augustine, however, declines even to judge himself78. Paul cares little for any human judgment, his own included, because the Lord will reveal the counsels of hearts79. Augustine adds that men’s verdicts differ from God’s testimony80, and à Kempis that God’s judgment is hidden and unerring81. Mill gives this a secular turn: conscience takes the vacant judgment-seat where society cannot hold a man accountable82.
Scripture and the Koran agree that God judges every hidden work83 and repays deeds done in the body84, with deeds weighed in the balance85. Pascal notes that God judges the inward while the Church judges only the outward86, and Dante rebukes mortals who judge at a thousand miles with a span’s vision87. The last tribunal gives judging back to the saints, who will judge the world and angels88,89. Yet within religion judgment returns as a human task. Luther gives every believer the power to discern right in faith90. Pascal lays down rules for judging true miracles from false91,92 and weighs which of miracle and doctrine is clearer93. Hume makes the judge of a miracle report weigh deceived or deceiving witnesses against the improbability of the event94. Rousseau insists on hearing every revelation’s proofs before deciding95.
In the arts the central question is who is fit to judge. Dryden ranks readers by capacity96,97 and holds that poets best judge their own art98, though an author is the worst judge of his own work99. Hume finds the true judge rare, one combining strong sense, delicacy, practice, comparison and freedom from prejudice100. Burke denies that taste is a separate faculty. For him it is a refined judgment improved by exercise101,102, and wrong taste is defective judgment103. Wordsworth calls taste in poetry an acquired talent104,105. Arnold warns that the historic and personal estimates corrupt the real estimate106,107, and he proposes great lines held in memory as touchstones108. Connoisseurship gives the question a concrete shape. Cellini’s Pope sees his rivals’ mistake109, Cellini detects the flaw in a cropped diamond110, and his rival Bandinello is made to value the Perseus and judges it honestly111. The fallibility of critics becomes a political argument in Milton. Licensers are fallible men who cannot be trusted to judge books112, and the drudgery of the office ensures ignorant successors113, whereas a discreet reader can turn even bad books to use114. Johnson’s survey of editors exposes rash conjecture115,116. Wordsworth adds that critics mistaught by false systems are worse than untaught117, and Mazzini asks for a criticism that shakes the tree of genius without hewing it down118.
The court gives judgment its oldest institution. Aeschylus stages its founding: Athena hears both sides, convenes judges, and acquits by a tied vote119,120. Hobbes later rationalizes that rule, holding that not condemning is absolving121. Socrates reminds his judges that their duty is to judge by the laws, not to grant favors122. Bacon would have judges interpret law, not make it123, and he defines the parts of hearing a case124. Hobbes bars any man from arbitrating his own cause125, echoing Pascal’s maxim. Penn says the judge must be indifferent to persons, not to causes126. Pliny shows the procedure of judgment in detail, insisting that death, banishment and acquittal be counted as distinct votes127, and referring doubtful cases to Trajan128. The literature of injustice is long. More describes judges wresting law for the king129 and is himself sentenced on failed evidence130. Bunyan’s Lord Hategood presides over Vanity Fair131. Racine’s Theseus rethinks his rash condemnation of his son132, and Manzoni’s magistrates find poisoners too easily133. Lincoln answers that an erroneous decision is a limited evil and can be overruled134, which is Mill’s principle of correctability carried into law. In public affairs the test is the event. Franklin wonders how Loudoun was given an army135, and Haskell condemns Sickles’ unordered advance136. Drake’s men judge that the quality of judgment counts for more than numbers137, and Burke denies that electors can judge qualities they have no means of knowing138.
These authors broadly agree about the corrupters of judgment and about the value of practice and of hearing both sides. They part on its seat: reason for Descartes, intuition and heart for Pascal, cultivated sentiment for Hume and Burke. The ancient Stoic placed in judgment the whole of our peace, while the moderns placed in it chiefly the hope of correction. What remains open is the question Pascal posed: whether in matters of truth any fixed point of view exists from which judgment could be sure28, or whether, as the religious authors suggest, only a judge who knows the heart can judge without error.
Introductory essay written by Claude Opus 5.5 from the outline and the notes on every passage below; quotations are checked against this edition.
See also: Religion 3c · Miracles 6a · Reasoning 6b
See also: Beauty 8b · Art 5a · Poetry 10c
See also: History 6c · Poetry 10c
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See also: War and Peace 8d