Chapter 29
Experience as a source of knowledge and skill; experiment; learning from life.
761 passages · 202 principal · Covers the 49 volumes of primary texts
Experience, in the broad sense these books give it, covers several things. It is the stock of remembered particulars from which men gather prudence. It is the first-hand observation that a traveller or physician sets against report and authority. It is the hard instruction of suffering and practice. And it is the deliberate trial of nature that the moderns call experiment. The idea is great for the Harvard Classics because nearly every other question of knowledge passes through it: what we can know of causes, of other men, of God, of beauty and of duty. It also divides the authors sharply. To some, experience is the mother of all the sciences; to others, it is a teacher that proves nothing necessary and may dupe us to the end.
The most economical definition is Hobbes’s. Experience is much memory, or memory of many things1, and from it comes prudence, the art of guessing by signs2,3. Reason, by contrast, is not gotten by experience only4. Because prudence is simply accumulated memory, Hobbes thinks men of equal age and application are nearly equal in it5,6. Hume extends the point downward. The child learns to avoid the candle flame, and old animals show a sagacity born of long observation7,8. Yet Hume also suggests that the common distinction between reason and experience is superficial, since every argument ends in general principles known only by observation9. Here a first fault line appears. Is experience a lower faculty that reason surpasses, or is it the ground on which reason itself stands?
A long line of writers sets experience against books and schools. Montaigne treats every object of daily life as a book, and holds that judging and speaking are learned by exercise10. Descartes abandons letters for the book of the world, judging the practical reasoning of men in their affairs truer than the speculations of the study11. Harvey learns and teaches anatomy from dissection, not from the positions of philosophers12. Among the moderns the theme grows almost evangelical. For Channing the laborer’s own life is a volume more instructive than any book13. Emerson calls life our dictionary14 and wants science taught by the spark and the planet rather than by lectures15. Newman holds that political wisdom requires firsthand familiarity with business and persons16. Dana’s ship’s cook rebukes the college boy’s reasoning with the sea-time he has served himself17. Bacon strikes the balance most exactly: studies must be bounded by experience, and the wisdom of using them comes from observation, not from study18.
The same opposition governs speculation and a priori theory. Bacon wants philosophy to stop floating in air and rest on experience well examined and weighed19. Pascal argues that the ancients erred from lack of experience, not weakness of reasoning, so the telescope corrects them without insulting them20. Locke prefers Boyle’s rational experiments to speculative systems21. Emerson finds the English temper made of distrust of theory and surrender to fact22. He also reports that Kepler and Euler held experience must follow the laws of the mind, which the English repudiate23. The empiricist doctrine proper is stated by Hume: all the materials of thinking derive from outward or inward sentiment24,25. Mill’s Logic carries it on against the intuitionists26, and Mill values the school of Experience and Association because it explains feelings by circumstances, as reformers require27. Rejoinders are not wanting. Rousseau’s vicar answers that universal moral agreement contradicts the claim that the mind holds only what experience instils28. Schiller makes the unity of the mind a condition of the very possibility of experience29.
The sharpest limits are drawn by Kant. Experience can never certify that any action sprang purely from duty30. To derive duty from experience hands victory to the cynics who see self-love everywhere31. And no examples can furnish apodictic law32,33. Freedom itself cannot be proved from experiences of human nature34. Schiller makes the parallel claim for beauty. Experience shows only individuals and cannot be the tribunal of what beauty is35; it shows that beauty exists, not how it is possible36. Burke, by contrast, insists that a sound theory of the beautiful must rest on experience of common things37, and he faults rival theories for not consulting it38. Hume grounds the rules of art on general observation of what pleases39.
Hume, however, also raises the most famous doubt about experience. Past experience informs us only of past objects, so why extend it to the future40? Any probable argument for doing so would be circular41. The extension is made by custom, not by reasoning42,43. Even after a thousand experiments we cannot justify believing the stone will fall44. Hobbes had already called presumption of the future uncertain45. Other writers stress the narrowness of experience rather than its logic. Pascal shows the ancients denying a vacuum only because their experiments had never shown one46, and he laments that experience dupes us from misfortune to misfortune47. Lyell observes that land-dwellers see only decay and so misjudge the processes of change48. Mill adds that experience does not correct error without discussion to interpret it49.
Hume nonetheless makes experience the sole guide in matters of fact. Adam could not have inferred that water would suffocate him50, and every law of nature is known by observed conjunction51,52. Berkeley says the same of perception: we learn by experience which ideas will follow, so that a man born blind and given sight would have no notion of distance53,54. Human conduct is known in the same way. Long acquaintance with men lets us infer motives55, and we predict a friend’s conduct, or the fate of a purse left on the pavement, almost as surely as the motions of bodies56. Pliny’s long service as advocate and judge had taught him how slight things decide57. From this Hume draws his argument on testimony. Our credit in witnesses rests wholly on experience of their veracity58, so a reported miracle sets experience against experience, and uniform experience amounts to a full proof59,60. Darwin practises the gentler version, weighing a strange story by partial ocular proof and corroborating witnesses61.
Experience also names the school of life. Paré learned the treatment of gunshot wounds by chance and practice, not by books62. Dana holds that no man knows sailors unless he has lived among them63, and his landsman’s helplessness amid unintelligible orders64 shows what the Hippocratic oath calls the bad treasure of inexperience65. Emerson makes action essential to the scholar: “only so much do I know as I have lived”66. Suffering teaches what precept cannot. Burns finds in losses and crosses severe lessons in self-knowledge67. Bunyan’s Christiana says none can know the Valley until they pass through it68. Mill observes that proverbs are truly understood only when painful experience makes them real69. Don Quixote calls proverbs sentences drawn from experience, “the universal mother of sciences”70. The authority of the seasoned is a common theme, yet it is qualified. Bacon warns that the experience of age misleads in new things71. Milton’s Satan tempts Christ with the claim that private life lacks the best school of experience72. Hume grants that an entirely unexperienced reasoner would be no reasoner at all73.
Travel and witness form a further strand. Bacon counts travel a part of experience for the elder and wants it recorded in diaries74. Milton makes travel the means of enlarging practical knowledge75. Locke complains that youths who travel under governors make no observations of their own76. Tennyson’s Ulysses turns all this into a figure: experience is an arch through which the untravelled world gleams77. Herodotus distinguishes what he saw from what he heard78,79. Harrison sets his own examination of an adder against Nicander80. Darwin weighs a load himself to test an exaggerated account81. Raleigh relies on repeated assays by London refiners82 and warns that men without experience mistake glistering stones for ore83.
In practical and professional affairs the same appeal becomes evidence. Smith argues from observed prices, wages and failed companies84,85,86. He also notes that farming demands knowledge books cannot capture87. Cellini consults the Paris founders, each party trusting its own practice and predicting the other’s failure88. Darwin credits miners’ wanderings with finding veins89. In medicine, observation overturns authority. Paré’s patients refute de Vigo90. Bacon holds a man’s own observation of what helps him the best physic91. Holmes gathers practitioners’ cases against sceptics who relied on solitary experience92,93.
Politics stages the open controversy. Burke calls the science of government experimental, not a priori, and urges caution before pulling down institutions whose effects are slow94. He mocks the revolutionaries who abjure the “heresies of experience”95 and likens their schemes to empirics experimenting on the state96. Old establishments, he argues, are tried by their effects, and theories are drawn from them97. Sydney Smith turns the argument around. If experience is the mother of wisdom, the later generation is the experienced one, and the ancestors were young98,99. Machiavelli offers knowledge of great men from long experience100. Mill learned the difficulties of public affairs in office101. Lowell calls precedent embodied experience102, while Marshall would leave the legislature free to avail itself of experience103. Mill moves the question into private life. He calls for experiments of living104, treats others’ experience as presumptive evidence only105, and answers objectors who say experience has already settled moral truths106.
In letters, Johnson finds that Shakespeare grew wise by observation, since books cannot confer vigilance107. Goethe insists that pure observation is rare because we confuse sensation and opinion with experience108. Bagehot charges that the ascetic, untempted, cannot comprehend temptation109. Thoreau prizes the tan and callus of experience110. Hume makes taste a matter of practice and comparison111, tested by the consent of ages112. Religious writers claim a knowledge of their own kind. Penn knows God by felt mercy, not by report113. Luther says faith cannot be written of without tasting it under tribulation114. Emerson’s true preacher converts life into truth115, though he also denies that experience can silence man’s great hopes116.
Finally, experiment, which is experience made deliberate. Bacon criticizes aimless trying and the pursuit of experiments of fruit rather than of light117. He holds that the sense judges the experiment and the experiment the thing118, and he wants experiments reported with their manner so that others may check them119. Descartes needs experiments to choose among the many ways an effect might be deduced120, but he finds others’ experiments ill-described or falsified by their principles121. Pascal makes experiments the sole principles of physics122. The practice fulfils the program. Harvey’s vivisections and ligatures overturn received opinion123,124,125. Jenner inoculates with cowpox and then with smallpox matter126, using a control127. Pasteur’s sealed flasks show life without air128,129. Darwin floats seeds in sea water130 and grows 537 plants from a cup of pond mud131. Faraday urges his audiences to repeat his experiments at home132,133. The method also breeds its own critique of bad trials. Pasteur traces Liebig’s failure to contamination134, and Darwin weighs Gärtner’s conflicting results135,136.
What remains open is the question the books keep returning to: whether experience, however refined, can reach necessity, duty or the ideal, or whether, as Hume and Kant from opposite sides suggest, something not given by experience must vouch for what experience teaches.
Introductory essay written by Claude Opus 5.5 from the outline and the notes on every passage below; quotations are checked against this edition.
See also: Prudence 1a
See also: Duty 1a
See also: Reasoning 6a · Cause 2b · Custom and Convention 1b
See also: Cause 2a
See also: Miracles 5a · Reasoning 6b
See also: Geology 8a
See also: Art 8b
See also: Medicine 8c · Cause 9b
See also: Beauty 8b
See also: Science 2a · Mind 6c · Progress 3c · Cause 7a
See also: Medicine 10a · Animal 1d · Science 3b · Reasoning 5a
See also: Medicine 9c · Life and Death 1d · Quantity 4d · Cause 9b
See also: Animal 3b · Induction 5a · Evolution 5c
See also: Physics 6a · Cause 8c · Hypothesis 2a · Science 3a
See also: Evolution 5d · Life and Death 1d
See also: Cause, Medicine, Science, Physics, Reasoning, Hypothesis